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LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW
The following is a complete list of all the parties in the proceedings before the Fourth
District Court, State of Utah, Utah County, Orem Department:
The Honorable John C. Backlund, Judge, Presiding.
The City of Orem, Plaintiff, represented by Robert J. Church.
The defendant, Cameron Michael Fernandez represented by Randall K. Spencer.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court judge erroneously grant appellee's Motion to Dismiss based on a
finding of double jeopardy?
Standard of Review. This Court will review a trial court's conclusions as to the legal
effect of a given set of found facts for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
Nevertheless, it may still grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a given fact
situation. Id. at 938-39.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502 (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210 (16-18) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.2(1) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-705 (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-15 (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-409 (1953, as amended)
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STATEMENT O F THE CASE
Appellee was charged by Amended Information on January 23, 2001, with (I) Possession
of a Forged Writing, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of §76-6-502, U.C.A.; (II) Theft of
Services, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of §76-6-409 U.C.A.; and (III) Willful Interference
with Lawful Activities of Faculty, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of §76-8-705 U.C.A. (R.
26.)
In prior hearings, not subject to this appeal, on appellee's motion, Counts I and III were
dismissed by the trial court. (R. 65, 32.) After reviewing Memoranda submitted by both parties
and listening to oral argument on the issue of double jeopardy, the Trial Court granted appellee's
motion to dismiss Count II, Theft of Services. (R. 57.)
On August 29, 2000, appellee purchased a temporary UVSC parking permit for $5.00.
The permit was valid from August 29, 2000 through September 5, 2000. (R. 76, pp. 47, 48.) At
some point, appellee used a black marker and changed the "5" to an "8" on the parking permit.
This was done so that on the face of the permit, it appeared that it was valid through September
8, 2000. Appellee did this without permission from UVSC. He did not pay an additional fee to
UVSC for the additional days he received by altering the parking permit, which fee would have
been approximately three dollars ($3.00). (R. 76, pp. 48,60.) On September 7, 2000, the
defendant displayed the altered pass when he parked his car in lot "Q" on the campus of UVSC.
On September 7, 2000, Adam Johnson, a parking officer with the UVSC parking
enforcement division, was patrolling lot "Q" and noticed the temporary parking permit hanging
from defendant's rear view mirror. Johnson noticed that the date appeared to have been altered
by writing in black marker over the original date. Johnson called the parking permit office to
2

verify the expiration date on the parking pass. (R. 76, pp. 49-50.) Johnson was informed that the
permit had expired on September 5, 2000. Per University policy, defendant's car was booted.
(R. 76, p. 51.)
Appellee returned to his car and discovered that his car had been booted. He went to the
parking office and paid a fine of $35 for the altered permit and a fee of $30 to have the boot
removed. (R. 76, p. 52, 70, 71.) He was not charged for the additional days parking privilege he
received after he altered the parking permit. (R. 76, pp. 60, 70.) The cashier in the parking
office failed to collect the pass and failed to notify the appellee that he needed to give the pass to
the parking officer. (R. 76, p. 124.) University parking policy is to collect the altered pass for
record keeping purposes. (R. 76, p. 56.)
Adam Bradley, another parking officer, was dispatched to respond to the appellee's car.
(R. 76, p. 82.) Bradley pulled up and parked his UVSC parking services truck parallel to the
appellee's vehicle to "immobilize" it until he could collect the permit. (R. 76, p. 85.) When
Bradley arrived at the car, a 4-door Acura, the appellee was not there. (R. 76, p. 82.)
As a courtesy, Bradley went ahead and removed the boot prior to the appellee's arrival
and placed it in his truck. (R. 76, pp. 82-83.) He then waited until the appellee returned so that
he could recover the altered parking pass from the appellee. After a few minutes, the appellee
was dropped off by someone who then left the parking lot. (R. 76, p. 84.)
Bradley approached the appellee and asked that the permit be given to him. The appellee
refused, asking why Officer Bradley needed it. (R. 76, p. 86.) Officer Bradley attempted several
times to explain the university's policy of recovering the altered permit upon removal of the boot
to the appellee. (R. 76, p. 86-87.) The appellee refused to listen to each explanation and
3

continued to refuse to turn the permit over to Officer Bradley despite repeated requests by
Bradley to do so. (R. 76, p. 87.)
Bradley told the appellee that if he did not turn over the permit that Bradley would reboot
the car. The appellee said something to the effect of, "Go ahead and try it." (R. 76, p. 88.)
Bradley then returned to his truck, obtained a portion of the boot and began walking back
towards the appellee's vehicle. By that point, the appellee had positioned himself near the tire to
be booted. (R. 76, p. 88.) Because Bradley had been assaulted by a UVSC student in the past for
booting that student's car, Bradley did not attempt to reboot the car. (R. 76, p. 80, 89.)
Instead, Bradley contacted campus police dispatch and requested a uniformed police
officer be dispatched to his location. (R. 76, p. 89.) Officer Andy Clements responded to
parking lot "Q" with Officer Les Newell responding as backup. (R. 76, pp. 91, 92, 103.) After
Officer Clements arrived on the scene and discovered what was happening, he also asked that the
appellee turn over the parking permit to Bradley. Appellee continued to refuse, stating that he
had paid for the altered parking pass. Appellee's attitude by this time was becoming increasingly
"belligerent." (R. 76, p. 106.)
At this point, Officer Newell arrived. (R. 76, pp. 107, 115.) He too, repeatedly asked that
the appellee turn over the altered parking permit. (R. 76, p. 117). Appellee refused each time.
Bradley again, attempted to explain the University policy to the appellee. (R. 76, p. 117).
Appellee continued to refuse to relinquish the parking permit. Appellee was told that they
needed the altered parking permit as evidence. Appellee responded by saying that his mother
was an attorney, that his father was on the L.A.P.D. (R. 76, p. 98.) that he was not going to hand
over the permit and that the situation at hand was "bullshit." (R. 76, p. 116.)
4

At that point, Officer Newell informed the appellee that he was being given a lawful
order to turn over the parking permit and that if he failed to do so, he would be arrested. (R. 76,
p. 118.) Rather than hand over the permit, the appellee began to tear it up. He was then arrested,
taken into custody by Officer Newell and transported to the Utah County Jail. (R. 76, p. 119.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Trial Court erroneously found that double jeopardy had attached in regards to Count
II of the amended information. Paying a fine to UVSC for possessing an altered parking permit
as well as a fine for having a boot removed from appellee's vehicle did not constitute punishment
for jeopardy purposes. As such, the City should not be prohibited from prosecuting appellee for
Theft of Services for obtaining additional days of parking privileges that he did not pay for.
Further, the Trial Court erred in relying on appellee's Memorandum and case law in determining
that double jeopardy had attached.

ARGUMENT
I. PAYMENT OF A FINE TO UVSC FOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT IS NOT
TANTAMOUNT TO PUNISHMENT AND WOULD NOT PREVENT CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME ACTION NOR BE PROHIBITED BY THE
PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
The City recognizes that "protection against double jeopardy is a fundamental
constitutional right which prevents a defendant from being tried more than once for the same
crime." State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995) (citing U.S. Const, amend. V;
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Utah Const, art. I, § 12). However, in some cases, civil and criminal penalties for the same
action do not offend the principle of double jeopardy.
In State v. Davis, a recent case on this topic, the Supreme Court of Utah considered the
question: "when . . . [does] an in rem forfeiture constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes?" State v. Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1998).
Although the issue at hand more likely involves an in personam civil penalty (e.g., fine),
rather than an in rem forfeiture, the two analyses have been unified under Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), which the Davis Court relied on extensively in its holding.
According to the Davis Court "Hudson . . . further narrowed the circumstances in which
any civil penalty (whether it be a fine or a forfeiture) may constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. Hudson held that jeopardy cannot be established by a civil fine or penalty
unless it meets the criteria of United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)." Davis at 391
(citing Hudson, 522 U.S. 93) (emphasis added).
The Ward test is a two step analysis used to determine whether a civil penalty rises to the
level of punishment as to constitute jeopardy. "First, we .. . determine whether Congress, in
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference [civil
or criminal] for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at
248-49).
Furthermore, "Hudson disavowed a portion of the holding of an earlier case, United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989)... which had effectively held . . . [that]
6

excessiveness in relation to the nonpenal purpose assigned to the sanction [is] dispositive in
cases where a fine or penalty was unusually disproportionate to the cost caused by the
wrongdoer. Thus, Hudson makes it less likely that a civil penalty or fine constitutes criminal
punishment for double jeopardy purposes." Davis, at 391.
Applying the first prong of the Ward test to the case at hand, it can be seen that the state
legislature clearly intended that a person harmed by another's criminal activities be allowed to
pursue their civil remedies. It is also clear, that those proceedings and any fines or fees
associated with them, are civil in nature. Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). In
U.C.A. § 76-3-201.2(1) it states: "Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or
impair the right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover
damages from the defendant in a civil action." (Emphasis added.) Further, "Criminal
prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil action for redress for
damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section." U.C.A. § 76-6-409.1 (emphasis
added). Section 76-6-409.1 entitled, "Devices for theft of services - Seizure and destruction Civil actions for damages" clearly states that both a criminal action for theft of services may be
pursued as well as an action for civil damages and that double jeopardy will not be applicable.
Clearly, the state legislature has intended that someone, whether it be a person or an entity, who
has been injured by another's criminal activities, be allowed to pursue civil remedies against an
offender despite any criminal action that may take place against that person.
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Because the legislature adopted identical language regarding the right to pursue civil
remedies for Theft of Services1 as well as Retail Theft2, it is fair to assume that the intent of
U.C.A. § 78-11-153 is equally applicable to Theft of Services cases.
The Utah Legislature left no room for speculation that the penalty imposed under § 7811-15 U.C.A. was anything but a civil measure. Indeed, the section is entitled "Civil liability of
adult for shoplifting-Damages." U.C.A. § 78-11-15 Such labeling clearly takes the penalty out
the realm of other criminal penalties where there may be some question about double jeopardy.
Also, the Legislature limited the civil penalty so as not to exceed $1000. The
Legislature's limitation serves to sustain the constitutional right against double jeopardy by
ensuring that private retailers do not create and pursue civil penalties that may be so excessive as
to be interpreted as punitive.
The appellee's civil fines were a total of $65. Substantially less than the civil $1000 limit
allowed by the Legislature and substantially less than the cost of prosecuting this case.
("[FJederal in personam cases have allowed civil penalties that amounted to many times more
than the cost of prosecuting cases. See Rex Trailer, 350 U.S. at 154; Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at
548-49." Davis, at 392.) Appellee paid a fine of $30 for altering the permit and $35 for the

1

U.C.A. 76-6-409.1(4)

2

U.C.A 76-6-608(2)

3

An adult who wrongfully takes merchandise by any means, including but not limited to,
concealment or attempted concealment in any manner, either on or off the premises of the
merchant, with a purpose to deprive a merchant of merchandise or to avoid payment for
merchandise, or both, is liable in a civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to the
merchant in the amount of the retail price of the merchandise not to exceed $1,000, plus an
additional penalty as determined by the court of not less than $100 nor more than $500, plus
court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
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removal of the boot. He paid no amount of fine for the additional days of parking he wrongfully
obtained from UVSC. Such a sum is obviously not several times more than a cost of
"prosecuting cases." Thus, the second prong of Ward has been met and double jeopardy has not
attached. Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49).

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED COUNT II OF THE
INFORMATION BY RELYING ON ARGUMENTS SET FORTH BY APPELLEE.

From the Trial Court Judge's ruling, it is clear that he was persuaded by appellee's
Motion to Dismiss and by his Reply to the City's Response, ("...prepare appropriate Findings
and Conclusions and an Order consistent with the defendant's Memorandum in support of the
Motion." R. 57, Emphasis added.) Defense counsel argued that Brunner v. Collection Division,
945 P.2d 687 (Utah 1997) is the "seminal" Utah decision that is "on point" on this issue.
Brunner is not "on point" and should have played no part in the Trial Judge's ruling.
In Brunner, the Utah State Tax Commission ("the Commission") had assessed against the
defendant, taxes and penalties of $142,884 under the Drug Stamp Tax Act for possession of
20,185 grams of marijuana without the appropriate stamps affixed to the marijuana. Subsequent
to the imposition of the fine, the Salt Lake County Attorney's office filed a three-count
information charging the defendant with various felony offenses, including possession of the
marijuana. Defendant petitioned the Commission for a prehearing conference to prepare for a
formal hearing. Id. at 688. Prior to that hearing, defendant plead guilty in the criminal case and
was sentenced. Two years after his sentence, another prehearing conference was held before the
Commission where the defendant filed a motion for summary judged stating that imposing the
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tax would violate the Double Jeopardy clause. The Commission denied defendant's motion after
which the appeal was taken. Id. at 689.
On appeal, both parties stipulated that the Commission hearing from which Brunner
sought review was a formal adjudicative proceeding. Id. at 689. The Court found that jeopardy
attached in the Commission proceeding when the formal hearing convened and they began taking
evidence. Id. As for the criminal action, jeopardy had clearly attached and under double
jeopardy standards, the Commission's subsequent actions clearly violated the standard against
double jeopardy..
The State Tax Commission is empowered with adjudicative capabilities. They hold
formal adjudicative hearings. They can issue subpoenas, depose witnesses and administer oaths.
U.C.A. § 59-1-210 (16-18). From the Brunner case, it is obvious that at such proceedings,
jeopardy can attach. Brunner 945 P.d at 691.
In this case, there was no similar administrative proceeding. Unlike the Tax Commission
which is empowered to conduct its own hearings and levy fines for violations of state law, UVSC
has no such power. They can only assess fines for violations of their own internal policies. In
order to enforce a violation of law, they must turn to a prosecuting agency. In this case, the
appellee merely paid a fine. It cannot be argued that presenting oneself to a cashier and paying a
fine is the equivalent of an administrative or criminal proceeding where evidence is presented
and to which jeopardy can be attached.
The remainder of the Brunner case essentially dealt with the issue of illegally possessing
the controlled substance and how a person was only taxed for such illegal possession. Brunner,
945 P.2d at 690, 691. The same issue of "illegal possession" that was before the Tax
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Commission was the basis of the criminal action pursued by the Salt Lake County Attorney's
office. Id. at 687. That is not the case in regards to the Theft of Services charge.
Appellee Fernandez paid a fine for the removal of the boot and for the forged parking
pass. He was never assessed a fine for failing to pay for the additional days of parking he
wrongfully obtained from UVSC. He was never charged the fee for those additional days of
parking he wrongfully obtained from UVSC. The only way Brunner would apply to the Theft of
Services charge is if the appellee had also been charged some fine for the additional days of
parking. That has never happened. Therefore, Brunner is inapplicable to the facts of this count
of the Information and the Trial Court erred in relying on its holding in dismissing Count II of the
Amended Information.
CONCLUSION
The legislature has made it very clear that those harmed by another's criminal actions
should be allowed to pursue their civil remedies despite a criminal prosecution. From statute, it
is very clear that the legislature intended for those harmed through the various forms of statutory
theft be allowed to pursue their civil remedies. The fact that UVSC chose to assess and collect a
fine from appellee for altering the permit and having the boot removed does not prohibit a
subsequent criminal prosecution for appellee's parking in lot "Q" without paying for the
additional days. Because the requirements of Ward have been met, double jeopardy has not
attached and the appellee's motion should not have been granted. Further, the Trial Court erred
in relying on Brunner in concluding that double jeopardy had attached.
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Therefore, the appellant respectfully requests that the Trial Court's Order of Dismissal of
Count II, Theft of Services, be vacated and this case be remanded back to the Trial Court for
further proceedings consistent with this Order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of May, 2002.

Robert J. Church
Orem City Prosecutor

////
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Randall K. Spencer (6992)
ABBOTT, SPENCER, & SMITH LLC
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OREM DEPARTMENT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF OREM,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGE OF
THEFT OF SERVICES COUNT II OF
AMENDED INFORMATION

vs.

CASE NO. 001201656
CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ,
Defendant.

JUDGE JON C. BACKLUND

Pursuant to Defendant's motion to dismiss Count II of the Amended Information,
Faculty, the Court hereby enters the followingfindingsof fact, conclusions of law, and order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The underlying facts relevant to this motion are essentially not in dispute, and are set
forth in memorandafromcounsel.

2.

The Courtfindsthat prior to being charged with theft of services for illegal parking in
the above entitled matter, Defendant was issued two citations by the State at Utah
Valley State College.

3.

Defendant paid $60 pursuant to the two citations issued to him for illegal parking.

4.

In light of the above findings, the Court does not address the additional arguments of
Defendant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

Fundamental principles of Double Jeopardy bar prosecution of the charge of theft of
services in the above entitled matter.
Count II of the amended information should be dismissed.

ORDER
1.

Count II of the amended information, Theft of services, a class B misdemeanor, is
hereby ordered dismissed.

BY THE COURT this 2 ^

day of August, 2001.

Judge^on C. Backlund
Fourai District Court
Approval as to form:

Robert Church, Esq.
Orem City Attorney's Office
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Orem City
Attorney's Office, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah, 84057, this J 6 ^ d a y o f i W ^ , _ 2 0 0 p .

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - OREM COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OREM CITY,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION

vs.

Case No: 001201656

CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ,
Defendant.

Judge: JOHN C. BACKLUND
Date: 08/10/2001

Clerk: leslieac
The Court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss Count II of the
Amended Information THEFT OF SERVICES, based on double jeopardy.
Counsel for the defendant is requested to prepare appropriate
Findings and Conclusions and an Order consistent with the
defendant's Memorandum in support of the Motion. Having thus ruled
the Court does not reach the additional grounds argued by the
defendant of selective prosecution and the unconstitutional
application of the statute. The Court also schedules Oral Arguments
•.on Count I on the issue of whether or not the Defendant did, under
the facts agreed upon by both parties possess a forged writing with
the intent to defraud, by refusing to surrender the parking pass
after being directed to do so and before he tore up the pass.
cc: Orem City Attorney
Randall K. Spencer
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Randall K. Spencer (6992)
ABBOTT, SPENCER, & SMITIJ LLC
<h
)
Attorneys for Defendant
39 West 300 North U, 1T .
Provo, Utah 84601
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original oo^. b' of, i'ne in my office, as
_
such clerk Witness my hand and seal of
C I T Y OF O R E M ™ t L s
MOTSR^TO
. day of
^ ^

DISMISS COUNT I BASED
-OTTDOTJBXE JEOPARDY

Plaintiff,

BY.

_ Deputy Clerk

vs.

CASE NO. 001201656
JUDGE JON C. BACKLUND

CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, by and through his counsel of record,
RANDALL K. SPENCER, and hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to dismiss Count I of the charges in this matter based on the fact that
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I
BASED ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY

CITY OF OREM,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 001201656
CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ,
Defendant.
JUDGE JON C. BACKLUND

COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, by and through his counsel of record,
RANDALL K. SPENCER, and submits the following memorandum in support of Defendant's
motion to dismiss Count I of the Information based on double jeopardy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On September 7, 2000, Mr. Fernandez was a student at Utah Valley State College
(UVSC)inOrem,Utah.

2.

Mr. Fernandez was issued a temporary UVSC parking permit which expired on
September 5,2000.

3.

Defendant altered the permit, changing the 05 to 08 to enable him to park his car and
get to class on time that day.

4.

While in class, Defendant was issued citations for parking illegally (#OOG3064 &
#OOG3065), the first for altering the temporary permit and the second as an impound
fine. In addition, Defendant's car was booted so it could not be moved.

5.

Upon discovering the citations, Defendant went to the parking building on campus and
paid the fines associated with the alteration of the permit ($35.00 for altering the
permit, and $30.00 for a impound fee). Defendant was told that the boot would be
removed and he was free to move the car. At no time was Defendant asked to
surrender his parking permit nor was he given a copy of UVSC Parking Regulations.

6.

Upon returning to his car, Defendant found that the boot had been removed. However,
his vehicle was blocked by a UVSC vehicle. Adam Bradley, a UVSC employee, had
removed the boot and was standing nearby.

7.

Bradley approached Defendant who was now sitting in his vehicle and told Defendant
that he must hand over the expired parking permit before he would be allowed to
leave. Defendant asked Bradley for an explanation as to why he must hand over the
permit. Defendant was told that it was UVSC policy that he must hand over the permit
or his car would be rebooted by Bradley.

8.

When Bradley threatened to call police, Defendant told him to "go ahead." Bradley
did call for an officer and shortly thereafter, Officer Clements of the UVSC Police
Force arrived along with a parking officer.

9.

Defendant was told that by Officer Clements that he must return the permit.
Defendant informed Clements that if there was a regulation stating that he must return
the permit, he would return it but he would like to be shown the regulation. The only
reason given by Clements to return the parking permit was "Because I said so."

10.

Officer Newell then arrived, approached, and commanded Defendant to turn over the
permit in question. In response, Defendant tried to explain that he had paid his fines
and would like to know what regulation was forced Defendant to give up the old
permit. In a threatening manner, Newell stated it was a direct police order that
Fernandez surrender the permit immediately. Defendant tore the permit in half and
handed it to Newell

11.

At this point, Defendant was handcuffed and placed under arrest.

ARGUMENT
I. The Rule of Double Jeopardy States That Defendants Can Not be Punished Twice for
the Same Conduct.
Defendant was originally charged with Willful Interference with the Lawful Activities
of Faculty, and Possession of a Forged Writing. On January 23, 2001, the State amended the
complaint to add Theft of Services, a class B misdemeanor. Defendant made, what amounts to,
this same motion to this Court.prior to the amending of the complaint, in which the Court largely
concurred with Defendant's argument. The same arguments and principles previously argued
relative the the forgery charge apply to the facts of the present case, and Count II: Theft of
Services is barred by principles of double jeopardy.
Although in regards,to the forgery charge, the Court allowed the State to maintain the
cause of action for forgery for the time after the demand was made to Mr. Fernandez to
surrender his altered parking pass, and he refused to do so, the principles on which the cpurt
relied do not apply in regards to theft of services. Specifically, the testimony presented at the
evidentiary hearing was that the cost to park for a day where Mr. Fernandez parked was $ 1.00.
Notwithstanding the very short delay (minutes according to the testimony at the hearing) which
occurred because of Mr. Fernandez's initial unwillingness to hand over the parking permit, there
was no additional damage done to UVSC. They had already ticketed him and fined him $65.00
because of the alleged loss of $ 1.00, and the momentary delay would not have, and did not result
in a further loss of services to UVSC. Whereas in relation to the forgery charge, the court
reasoned that a jury could conclude that Mr. Fernandez's initial refusal to turn over the altered
parking permit could constitute a new possession with intent to defraud in the future. Therefore,
the following double jeopardy arguments should result in a complete dismissal of the theft of
services charge unlike the partial limitation on the forgery charge.
The constitutional guarantee against doublejeopardy affords a criminal defendant three
separate protections by prohibiting: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;
(2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for

the same offense. State v. Miller. 747 P.2d 440 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). As the U.S. Supreme
Court explained:
The Double Jeopardy Clause, whose application to this new context we are called upon
to consider, provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb." (quoting U.S. Const., Amdt. 5). This protection applies both
to successive punishments and to successive prosecutions for the same criminal offense."
U.S. v. Dixon. 509 U.S. 688. 695-696 (1993) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois. 391 U.S. 194 at 201).
Under both the Utah and U.S. Constitutions, once a defendant has been punished by the State,
Defendants can not be punished a second time for the same conduct or crime.
Double jeopardy is also barred by the Utah Constitution in Article I, Section 12, which
forbids "any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Punishing a Defendant twice
for one course of conduct is also specifically barred by statute in U.C. A. 76-1 -403 which states
in part:
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of'a single
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out
of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(b) The former prosecution:
(ii) resulted in conviction;
U.C. A. 76-1-405 further clarifies when a second prosecution is not barred by double jeopardy:
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred under the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the
knowledge of the prosecuting attorney bringing the subsequent prosecution and
with intent to avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt held invalid in a
subsequent proceeding on writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or similar
collateral attack.
II.

The Issuance of Citations by UVSC Police and the Payment of Fines Based on
Citations Constitutes Criminal Jeopardy.
Under Utah law, UVSC Police Officers are given state-wide jurisdiction to act as police

officers, including the discretion to arrest, charge crimes, or issue citations as part of their duties.
U.C. A. 53B-3-104. UVSC traffic regulations provide that "UVSC College Police have authority
to issue citations for violations of the Utah Annotated Code as well as UVSC Parking

Violations." UVSC Traffic Regulation §500.00. Statewide, police officers routinely issue
citations based on both Utah state law and local regulations. These charges represent Class C
misdemeanors and are punishable either by state statute or by penalties decided by local political
entities. The right to pass local parking violations is given UVSC (and all other state and private
universities) by statute, specifically U.C.A. §76-8-701. See UVSC Traffic Regulations
§1200.00:
Enforcement: The College President and Vice President for College Relations and
Campus support has the authority to make regulations concerning parking, traffic, and
traffic-related matters. As outlined in Utah Code §53B-3-101 [sic] through 103 and 768-701.
Chapter 3 of Title 53B of the Utah Code is the correct statute that gives UVSC power to enforce
traffic and parking violations. U.C.A. 53B-3-107 states it is a violation to "park a vehicle upon
any property owned or controlled by a state institution of higher education contrary to posted
signs authorized by the published rules and regulations of the institution...." U.C.A. 53B-3r 108
makes parking violations on state institution of higher learning a misdemeanor: "A violation of
this chapter is a misdemeanor."
Although U.C.A. 53B-3-108 makes parking violations on campuses criminal
misdemeanors, it is true that parking violators do not face the possibility of imprisonment when
issued UVSC parking citations. However, the overriding factor used by courts in deciding
whether jeopardy attaches in cases where the state fines citizens is whether the citizen receives
"punishment." Brunner v. Collection Division, 945 P.2d 687,691 (Utah 1997). In Brunner. the
Utah Supreme Court ruled that the drug stamp tax act was unconstitutional because it violated
double jeopardy.

The Utah Supreme Court specifically ruled that at the moment the tax

commission began a formal hearing concerning the drug tax stamp, jeopardy attached to the
criminal episode. Id. at 691. So too, anytime police officers issue citations and begin
proceedings that end in a citizen being punished, whether that punishment be financial or penal,
jeopardy attaches. This includes the issuance and payment of citations such as those issued in
the present case.

III. Further Prosecution Based on the Same Conduct, Would Constitute Double Jeopardy.
On September 7,2000, Defendant was issued two citations by UVSC Officer Adam D.
Johnson. According to Officer Johnson, "I came upon a vehicle that contained one of the
school's temporary parking permits hanging from the rear view mirror. I noticed that the date
on the permit looked as if it had been altered by writing in black marker over the original date."
Utah Valley State College Police Department, Voluntary Statement of Adam Johnson at 1. In
Officer Johnson's own words, he made a decision to issue Mr. Fernandez two citations based
on the altered parking permit (UVSC citations #OOG3064 & #OOG3065) as provided in
UVSC Traffic Regulation §§ 200.05; 500.00. Clearly Officer Johnson recognized that the
permit had been altered, the vehicle was parking illegally, and issued the citations based on
those facts. Mr. Fernandez immediately went to the Parking Office and made an appearance
as instructed. He was ordered to pay fines in the amount of $65.00, total. See attached copies
of receipts.
As a result, Defendant was charged and punished by the State of Utah for the act of
parking illegally on September 7, 2000. The State of Utah, through the actions of UVSC
Officer Johnson and UVSC Parking Office, made a choice, i.e., to charge and punish Defendant
for two violations in this matter (UVSC citations #OOG3064 & #OOG3065). It is a wellsettled legal principle, that once the State elects to charge a defendant and as a result the
defendant is punished, the State is precluded from revisiting the course of events to add new
charges. Specifically, the question is not whether the State couldhave charged another specific
crime based on the facts. The legal and moral principle is that once the state punishes a citizen
for a course of conduct, it loses the opportunity to revisit the matter to add new charges.
In this case, Defendant had been charged and punished by the State of Utah. Officer
Johnson's statement makes it clear, he issued the citations specifically because Defendant parked
illegally, using an altered parking permit. Mr. Fernandez paid the fine levied by the State for his
conduct. Therefore, jeopardy has attached and Mr. Fernandez can not be placed in jeopardy a
second time by the State.

At the time of his arrest, Mr. Fernandez was charged with evidence tampering, a 2nd
degree felony. The Utah County Attorney refused to proceed on those charges and referred the
matter to the City of Orem for any further prosecution. However, it is important to point out that
the charge Mr. Fernandez was originally arrested on was based on conduct unconnected to
possessing or altering the parking permit. It was based on the allegation that Defendant tore the
permit before handing it to Officer Clement, actions that occurred after he had paid his fine for
altering the permit. By charging Defendant with Theft of Services, the City of Orem has chosen
to charge Mr. Fernandez a third time for parking in a UVSC parking space with an altered
parking permit. This clearly violates the double jeopardy doctrine of both the U.S. and State of
Utah Constitution and U.C.A. §U.C.A. 76-1-403.
Finally, Utah case law applies in circumstances where multiple charges can arise from
a singe criminal episode. Specifically, further prosecution is prohibited by State v. ShondeL 453
P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) (where two statutes interdict the same conduct, but impose different
penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser punishment) and State v. Helmuth. 598 P.2d 333
(Utah 1979) (when an individual's conduct can be construed to be a violation of two overlapping
statutes, the more specific statute governs). Defendant's vehicle was booted under UVSC
Parking Regulations §200.5 which states, "ALTERATION OF THE DATE ON THE
TEMPORARY PERMIT, MAY RESULT IN VEHICLE BEING BOOTED AND
ADDITIONAL FINES." (capitalization in original). Given the facts in this case, this clearly is
a more specific regulation then the much more nebulous Theft of Services statute and therefore,
Helmuth applies. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Dismiss Based on Unconstitutionality
of U.C.A. § 76-6-409 for a detailed discussion of the vagueness of this statute under the facts of
this case.
The Shondel argument is even more persuasive. It is important to understand that the
State is alleging that parking illegally in a UVSC parking space constitutes Theft of Services1.

'Defendant does not concede and argues in his Motion to Dismiss Based on the
Unconstitutionality of U.C.A. 76-6-409 that use of a parking stall can not be considered
Theft of Services.

However, Defendant had already been punished for parking his car illegally when the UVSC
traffic office fined Defendant $65.00. As a result, the State has already proscribed Theft of
Services (parking illegally), by charging Defendant under UVSC Traffic Regulation §§ 200.05,
for which Defendant had already been punished. See State v. Gomez 772 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah
1986) ("The criminal laws must be written so that there are significant differences between
offenses and so that the exact same conduct is not subject to different penalties depending on
which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge. To allow that would be to allow
a form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of law"). In this case, the prosecution has
charged and punished Defendant for parking illegally. The State is attempting to prosecute
Defendant again by alleging thatparking illegally constitutes Theft of Services. Shondel applies
in this situation and requires that Defendant receive the lesser penalty for parking illegally, a
penalty Defendant has already paid in full. In fact, as stated above, testimony at the evidentiary
established that the cost to park in the subject lot for a day was $1.00, and Mr. Fernande? has
already paid UVSC fines totaling $65.00 (65 times the alleged loss of service which is a
significant punishment).
In summary, the charge of Theft of Services is constitutionally barred by the doctrine
of double jeopardy. In addition, Utah case law clearly mandates that Mr. Fernandez can not
also be punished a second time when he was already properly punished for the lesser more
specific offense of parking illegally with an altered permit. This court has already agreed with
Defendant's analysis in an earlier motion.
In addition to the arguments made above, the "law of the case doctrine" also requires that
Count II: Theft of Services, be treated in a similar manner as the law the Court has established
relative to the Forgery charge. Except however, the potential future conduct which is
contemplated in the Forgery statute does not apply to the theft of services statute, and therefore
the delay in returning the altered permit cannot be construed as a new and separate act of theft
of services. In otherwords, relative to forgery, possession of a forged document with the intent
to defraud in the future can constitute a crime; whereas, the crime of theft of services must be

based on conduct which has already been committed, and there is no break in the continuous
alleged criminal episode of the act which the city alleges constitutes theft of services to justify
a new and separate act after the initial refusal to return the parking permit.
CONCLUSION
Calling parking illegally by a different name (Theft of Services) does not change the
fact that jeopardy has already attached to the conduct of Defendant the moment he paid his
parking fine. Because Mr. Fernandez has already been punished by the State of Utah for the
same conduct in the same criminal episode, further prosecution is barred by the doctrine of
double jeopardy under both the U.S. and Utah Constitutions and by Utah case law in Shondel
and Helmuth.
For all the above reasons, Defendant asks the court to grant this Motion to Dismiss.

Respectfully submitted this

/

1

day of March, 2001.

'Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing Motion to
Dismiss to the Orem City Attorney's Office, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah, 84057, this
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CITY OF OREM,
Plaintiff,

CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ,

/

Deput\|gfegfcoNSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 1
BASED ON DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION
Case No: 9912-1432
Judge John C. Backlund

Defendant.

COMES NOW the City of Orem ("the City") and hereby responds to the defendant's
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT ONE BASED ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY. In his MOTION,
the defendant moved this court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
dismiss the Theft of Services charge based upon a claim that trial or prosecution would violate
double jeopardy under both the United States and Utah Constitutions. (Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 1-1.) This argument is without merit.
The City contends that the fines paid by the defendant to UVSC for the altered permit and
the boot removal, were civil in nature and not criminal. As such, there would be no double
jeopardy violation. The City further contends that the defendant did not adequately carry his
burden in moving this court to dismiss the Theft of Services on the grounds of double jeopardy.

Aidcx\4atv\ &

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
1. As a service to its students, faculty and visitors, UVSC provides parking lots and
spaces. Lot "Q" where the defendant was parked, is a parking lot where a person may only park
after purchasing a parking permit.
2. On August 29, 2000, defendant purchased a temporary UVSC parking permit for
$5.00. The permit was valid from August 29, 2000 through September 5, 2000.
3. At some point, defendant used a black marker and changed the "5" to an "8M on the
parking permit. This was done so that on the face of the permit, it appeared that it was valid
through September 8, 2000. Defendant did this without permission from UVSC. He did not pay
an additional fee to UVSC for the additional days on the parking permit.
4. Upon altering the parking pass, on September 7, 2000, the defendant displayed it when
he parked his car in lot "Q" on the campus of UVSC.
5. The value of parking in a UVSC parking stall on a temporary parking permit is $ 1.00
per day. By altering the parking pass from September 5,2000 to September 8,2000, had the
defendant not been caught, he would have deprived UVSC of $3.00 in parking revenue.
6. That on September 7, 2000, Adam Johnson, a parking officer with the UVSC parking
enforcement division, was patrolling lot "Q" and noticed the temporary parking permit hanging
from defendant's rear view mirror. Johnson noticed that the date appeared to have been altered
by writing in black marker over the original date. Per department procedure, Johnson called the
parking permit office to verify the expiration on the parking pass. Johnson was informed that the
permit had expired on September 5, 2000. Again, according to University policy, defendant's car
was "booted."

2

7. Defendant returned to his car, discovered that his car had been booted. He went to the
parking office and paid a fine of $35 for the altered permit and a fee of $30 to have the boot
removed. The fines paid did not pay for the two additional days of parking the defendant had
obtained by altering the temporary parking permit. Hence, UVSC was deprived $2.00 in parking
revenue.
8. The cashier in the parking office failed to collect the pass and failed to notify the
defendant that he needed to return it to the parking officer.
9. University parking policy is to collect the altered pass for record keeping purposes.
10. Adam Bradley, another parking officer, responded to the defendant's car. Bradley
pulled up and parked his UVSC parking services truck parallel to the defendant's vehicle. Even
though the effect was to block defendant's car in the stall, the purpose for parking there was to
facilitate in the quick and immediate removal of the boot.
11. When Bradley arrived at the car, a 4-door Acura, the defendant was not there.
12. As a courtesy, Bradley went ahead and removed the boot prior to the defendant's
arrival and placed it in his truck. He then waited until the defendant returned so that he could
recover the altered parking pass from the defendant.
13. After a few minutes, the defendant was dropped off by someone who then left the
parking lot.
14. Bradley approached the defendant and asked that the permit be given to him. The
defendant refused, asking why Officer Bradley needed it. Officer Bradley attempted several
times to explain the university's policy of recovering the altered permit upon removal of the boot

3

to the defendant. The defendant refused to listen to the explanation and continued to refuse to
turn the permit over to Officer Bradley despite repeated requests by Bradley.
15. Bradley told the defendant that if he did not turn over the permit that Bradley would
reboot the car. The defendant said to go ahead and try it.
16. Bradley then returned to his truck, obtained a portion of the boot and began walking
back towards the defendant's vehicle. By that point, the defendant had positioned himself near
the tire. Because Bradley had been assaulted by a UVSC student in the past for booting that
student's car, Bradley did not attempt to reboot the car.
17. At that point, Bradley contacted campus police dispatch and requested a uniformed
police officer be dispatched to his location.
18. Officer Andy Clements responded to parking lot "Q" with Officer Les Newell
responding as backup.
19. After Officer Clements arrived on the scene and discovered what was happening, he
asked several times that the defendant turn over the parking permit to Bradley. Defendant
continued to refuse, stating that he had paid for it, meaning the altered parking pass. Defendant's
attitude by this time was becoming increasingly belligerent.
20. At this point, Officer Newell arrived. He too, asked that the defendant turn over the
altered parking permit several times. Defendant refused. Bradley again, attempted to explain the
University policy to the defendant. Defendant continued to refuse to relinquish the parking
permit.
21. Defendant was told that they needed the altered parking permit as evidence.
Defendant responded by saying that his mother was an attorney, that his father was on the
4

L.A.P.D. that he was not going to hand over the permit and that the situation at hand was
"bullshit"
22. At that point, Officer Newell informed the defendant that he was being given a
lawful order to turn over the parking permit and that if he failed to do so, he would be arrested.
23. Rather than hand over the permit, the defendant began to tear it up.
24. He was then taken into custody by Officer Newell.
ARGUMENT
I. PENALTIES; CIVIL AND CRIMINAL IN NATURE DO NOT NECESSARILY
VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
The City agrees that "protection against double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional
right which prevents a defendant from being tried more than once for the same crime." State v.
Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995) (citing U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, §
12). However, the present issue, where the defendant's actions potentially induce criminal and
civil penalties under Utah law, does not threaten a violation of those rights.
In State v. Davis, a recent case on this topic, the Supreme Court of Utah considered
" w h e n . . . [does] an in rem forfeiture constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes?" 972
P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1998).
Although the issue at hand more likely involves an in personam civil penalty (e.g., fine),
rather than an in rem forfeiture, the two analyses have been unified under Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), which the Davis Court relied on extensively in its holding.
According to the Davis Court "Hudson . . . further narrowed the circumstances in which
any civil penalty (whether it be a fine or a forfeiture) may constitute punishment for double
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jeopardy purposes. Hudson held that jeopardy cannot be established by a civil fine or penalty
unless it meets the criteria of United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248." Davis at 391 (citing
Hudson, 522 U.S. 93) (emphasis added).
The Ward test is a two step analysis to determine whether a civil penalty rises to the level
of punishment as to constitute jeopardy. "First, we . . . determine whether Congress, in
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference [civil
or criminal] for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at
248-49).
Furthermore, "Hudson disavowed a portion of the holding of an earlier case, United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989)... which had effectively held . . . [that]
excessiveness in relation to the nonpenal purpose assigned to the sanction [is] dispositive in
cases where a fine or penalty was unusually disproportionate to the cost caused by the
wrongdoer. Thus, Hudson makes it less likely that a civil penalty or fine constitutes criminal
punishment for double jeopardy purposes." Davis, at 391.
Applying the first prong of the Ward test to the case at hand, it can be seen that the state
legislature clearly intended that a person harmed by another's criminal activities be allowed to
pursue their civil remedies. Further, it is clear, that those proceedings and any fines or fees
associated with them, be labeled civil in nature. Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 24849). U.C.A. 76-3-201.2(1) states: "Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or
impair the right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover
6

damages from the defendant in a civil action." (Emphasis added.) Further, "Criminal
prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil action for redress for
damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section." U.C.A. 76-6-409.1, (emphasis
added). This section, entitled, "Devices for theft of services - Seizure and destruction - Civil
actions for damages" clearly states that both a criminal action for theft of services may be
pursued as well as an action for civil damages and that double jeopardy will not be applicable.
This section is identical to U.C.A 76-6-608(2)1 which allows a retail merchant to pursue civil
damages against a shoplifter. Clearly, the state legislature has intended that someone, whether it
be a person or an entity, who has been injured by another's criminal activities, be allowed to
pursue civil remedies despite any criminal action that may take place.
Because the legislature adopted identical language regarding the right to pursue civil
remedies for Theft of Services2 as well as Retail Theft3, it is fair to argue that the intent of U.C.A.
78-11-154 is equally applicable to Theft of Services cases.

1

Criminal prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil action
for redress for damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section. U.C.A. 76-6-608(2).
2

U.C.A. 76-6-409.1(4)

3

U.C.A 76-6-608(2)

4

An adult who wrongfully takes merchandise by any means, including but not limited to,
concealment or attempted concealment in any manner, either on or off the premises of the
merchant, with a purpose to deprive a merchant of merchandise or to avoid payment for
merchandise, or both, is liable in a civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to the
merchant in the amount of the retail price of the merchandise not to exceed $1,000, plus an
additional penalty as determined by the court of not less than $100 nor more than $500, plus
court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
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The Utah Legislature left no room for speculation that the penalty imposed under § 7811-15 was anything but a civil measure. Indeed, the section was entitled "Civil liability of adult
for shoplifting-Damages." Utah Code § 78-11-15 (1999) (emphasis added). Such labeling
clearly takes the penalty out the realm of other criminal penalties where there may be some
question about double jeopardy.
Also, the Legislature limited the civil penalty so as not to exceed $1000. The
Legislature's limitation serves to sustain the constitutional right against double jeopardy by
ensuring that private retailers do not create and pursue civil penalties that may be so excessive as
to be interpreted as punitive.
The defendant's civil fines did not exceed the civil $1000 limit allowed by the
Legislature. Furthermore, "[f]ederal in personam cases have allowed civil penalties that
amounted to many times more than the cost of prosecuting cases. See Rex Trailer, 350 U.S. at
154; Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at 548-49." Davis, at 392. In this case, defendant paid a fine of
$30 for altering the permit and $35 for the removal of the boot. Such a sum is surely not several
times more than a cost of "prosecuting cases." Thus, the second prong of Weird has been met and
double jeopardy has not attached. Davis, at 391 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49).
CONCLUSION
The legislature has made it very clear that those harmed by another's criminal actions
should be allowed to pursue their civil remedies despite a criminal prosecution. To adopt
defendant's argument that UVSC should not be allowed to pursue a criminal prosecution for
Theft of Services after they have collected civil fines would preclude every merchant in this state
from pursuing their civil remedies. From statute, it is clear that this is not the intent. Because the
8

requirements of Ward have been met, double jeopardy has not attached and the defendant's
motion should be denied.
Dated this &V^day of April, 2001.

~$aA^

Robert J. Church
Orem City Prosecutor

////

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 70^
day of
Af)d
postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing to:
Randall K. Spencer
ABBOTT, SPENCER & SMITH, LLC
39 West 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Fax: 375-0199
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2001,1 mailed,

ORDER
After due consideration of the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One Based
on Double Jeopardy and the City of Orem's Response thereby, the Court hereby denies the
defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this

day of

, 2001.
FOURTH DISTEJCT COURT

Judge John C. Backlund

Randall K. Spencer (6992),
ABBOTT, SPENCER, & SMITH LLC
Attorneys for Defendant) T
39 West 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone 377-9696
IE FOURTH JUDICIALnDISTWC¥COURT
IN THE
'UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF-UTA'H*
'Deputy Clerk
REPLY TO PROSECUTION'S
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I
BASED ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY

CITY OF OREM
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 001201656
CAMERON MICHAEL FERNANDEZ,
JUDGE JON C. BACKLUND
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, by and through his counsel of record,
RANDALL K. SPENCER, and submits the following Answer to Plaintiffs Response to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Information Based on Double Jeopardy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant affirms the facts as outlined in Defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Count I Based on Double Jeopardy (Defendant's
Memorandum), previously submitted to this court.
ARGUMENT
I. The City has failed to raise a cogent legal argument to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.
The City has mis-understood the double jeopardy doctrine. As presented in Defendant's
original motion, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy affords a criminal
defendant three separate protections by prohibiting: (1) a second prosecution for the same

AA(k*AvTY\ t

offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3)
multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
In this case, it is the ban against successive punishments that is the principal in question before
the court.
In the City's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count 1 Based on Double
Jeopardy and Order Denying Defendant's Motion (City's Response), the City mistakenly argues
the principal that states can exact both a criminal and civil penalty for a single criminal course
of conduct. This is a well-settled principal, that the City has carefully supported in it's response.
Unfortunately, that principal has nothing to do with the present double jeopardy argument. In
the present case, double jeopardy refers to the situation where a defendant is punished in
separate, successive civil or criminal actions by the City for one criminal episode. The City has
conceded that in the present case, the City is attempting to extract a criminal and civil
punishment (for theft of services), after it has already extracted what it characterizes as a civil
punishment (the original parking citation). City'ss Response at 8. What the City fails to
mention or address in City's Response is that the Utah Supreme Court has already stated that
such actions violate double jeopardy.
The City completely ignores the seminal Utah decision that is "on point" in the present
case, Brunner v. Collection Division. 945 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1997). As argued previously,
in Brunner, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the drug stamp tax act was unconstitutional
because a second punishment, even a civil punishment, violated double jeopardy. The Utah
Supreme Court specifically ruled that at the moment the tax commission began a formal hearing
concerning the drug tax stamp, jeopardy attached to the criminal episode. Id. at 691. As the
Court stated:
We reverse the Commission and hold that the Drug Stamp Tax Act is punitive and,
thus, when imposed in connection with but separate from related criminal proceedings,
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Brunner at 691. As the Utah Supreme Court made very clear in Brunner, the City cannot exact
a punitive civil punishment and a prior (or subsequent) separate punitive action against a

Defendant. Such separate punitive actions by the City constitute double jeopardy. Like the
Drug Stamp Tax Act, a parking citation is at least a quasi-criminal or punitive action taken by
the State. This circumstance is not similar to the availability of a civil remedy against a
shoplifter by the victim in addition to the State proceeding.
To support it's argument, the City cites a number of U.S. Supreme Court cases, relying
primarily on issues which are not relevant to the issue at hand. First, each U.S. Supreme Court
case cited by the City involves the issue that combining both civil and criminal penalties in
one action against a defendant is constitutionally permitted (e.g., civil forfeiture along with
criminal fines and imprisonment). The cases cited by the City do not address the present issue
of bringing multiple, separate punitive punishments against a defendant for one criminal
episode; furthermore, in the authority cited by the City, civil forfeitures have been deemed
purely civil in nature unlike a traffic citation issued by police officers commissioned by the
State of Utah which is obviously criminal or at least quasi-criminal in nature. Secondly, it
is the Utah Supreme Court that has ultimate responsibility for interpreting how double
jeopardy principles apply in Utah courts. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court rules on double
jeopardy, such rulings are a constitutional "bar" that states may not lower. In other words,
Cities or States are free to provide greater protection against double jeopardy under the Utah
Constitution then are provided under the U.S. Constitution.1
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly ruled in Brunner that separate and distinct punitive
actions against a defendant is barred by the double jeopardy doctrine. The Court in the present
case recognized this principle in partially granting Defendant's initial double jeopardy motion.
The part of the motion which the court did not grant was based on the Court's conclusion that
there was a new and separate criminal episode when Defendant refused to return the altered
parking pass when the officer demanded such. In relation to the theft of services charge, there

i

Defendant does not concede that the City has shown that under the U.S. Constitution it's
actions in the present case do not constitute double jeopardy. In fact, such is not the case, and
the City's actions in the present situation constitutes double jeopardy under both constitutions.

is not a new criminal episode separate and distinct from the initial act of improperly altering
the parking pass and improperly parking in the lot which Defendant was cited for and
punished.
In summary, Defendant again reiterates that Officer Johnson's issuance of a citation for
illegal parking was a choice by the City/State to punish Defendant for his actions in this
matter. Once the City has chosen to punish a citizen for criminal actions, the City is
constitutionally and morally prohibited from revisiting the episode to impose further civil or
criminal punishment.
II. The City Has Ignored Defendant's Shondel and Helmuth Arguments.
In Defendant's Memorandum, Defendant raised the legal arguments that not only did
double jeopardy apply, but also that the Utah Supreme Court's interpretations of the statutory
prohibitions against multiple prosecutions for a single criminal episode also apply in the
present case, i.e., State v. Shondel 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) (where two statutes interdict
the same conduct, but impose different penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser
punishment) and State v. Helmuth, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979) (when an individual's conduct
can be construed to be a violation of two overlapping statutes, the more specific statute
governs). It seems obvious that a person who parks in a lot and does not pay for it is a perfect
illustration of a situation where the statute authorizing a parking violation is the most specific
statute applicable to the facts rather than the Statute with a greater punishment such as theft
of services. Defendant will not take the court's time to re-argue these points here, but refer
the court to Defendant's Memorandum. By ignoring these arguments, Defendant submits the
City has waived any legal position in opposition.
CONCLUSION
As Defendant stated in Defendant's Memorandum:
In summary, the charge of Theft of Services is constitutionally barred by the
doctrine of double jeopardy. In addition, Utah case law clearly mandates that Mr.
Fernandez cannot also be punished a second time when he was already properly
punished for the lesser more specific offense of parking illegally with an altered
permit. This court has already agreed with Defendant's analysis in an earlier
motion.

Defendant's Memorandum at 9. Defendant believes the same summary is not only still
valid, but also stands unchallenged by the City. For all the reasons set forth above, the
Court should grant Defendant's motion to dismiss on principles of Double Jeopardy
and/or the Shondel/Helmuth doctrine.

Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 2001.

Randall K. Spencer
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing Motion to
Dismiss to the Orem City Attorney's Office, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah, 84057, this

CI- day of / / j w i A

2001.

Addendum "F"
Statutes
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210 (16-18) (1953, as amended) General powers and duties
The powers and duties of the [State Tax] commission are as follows:
(16) to subpoena witnesses to appear and give testimony and produce records
relating to any matter before the commission;
(17) to cause depositions of witnesses to be taken as in civil actions at the request
of the commission or any party to any matter or proceeding before the
commission;
(18) to authorize any member or employee of the commission to administer oaths
and affirmations in any matter or proceeding relating to the exercise of the powers
and duties of the commission;

2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.2(1) (1953, as amended) Civil action by victim for damages
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the right of a
person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the
defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay
restitution under this part or Section 77-18-1, may not be introduced in any civil action
arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the restitution. However, the
court shall credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in
favor of the victim in the civil action.

3. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-409 (1953, as amended) Theft of Services
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are available only for
compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid the due
payment for them.
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services of another,
to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his own benefit or to the
benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them.
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service,
public utility and transportation services, restaurant, hotel, motel, tourist cabin, rooming
house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers
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for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment,
exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for which a charge is made.
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television
services, only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not
described in Section 76-6-409.3.
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the services are
obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in Sections 76-6-409.5
through 76-6-409.9.

4. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409.1(4) (1953, as amended) Device for theft of services ~ Seizure
and destruction — Civil actions for damages
(1) A person may not knowingly:
(a) make or possess any instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device for the use
of, or for the purpose of, committing or attempting to commit theft under Section
76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3; or
(b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport, or otherwise transfer to another any
information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device, or any information,
plan, or instruction for obtaining, making, or assembling the same, with intent that
it be used, or caused to be used, to commit or attempt to commit theft under
Section 76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3.
(2) (a) Any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device, or information,
plan, or instruction referred to in Subsection (1) may be seized pursuant to a court order,
lawful search and seizure, lawful arrest, or other lawful process.
(b) Upon the conviction of any person for a violation of any provision of this
section, any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, device, plan, or
instruction shall be destroyed as contraband by the sheriff of the county in which
the person was convicted.
(3) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(4) Criminal prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil action
for redress for damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section.
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